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TENANT STORIES: OBSTACLES AND
CHALLENGES FACING TENANTS TODAY
MARY SPECTOR*
Nearly forty years after the courts first recognized a warranty
of habitability in residential leases, the notion that a tenant may
have "rights" in a residential tenancy is no longer a novelty.
Rather, tenants' rights are firmly embedded in residential
landlord-tenant codes in most states, with more stringent tenant
protection available in some urban areas. Unfortunately,
widespread codification of tenant protection does not always mean
the effective exercise of that protection. At the beginning of the
21st century, tenants and their advocates still face many of the
same challenges they faced forty years ago in the fight for safe,
habitable, affordable housing. Yet they also face new challenges,
in many cases as a direct result of an increasingly complex legal
climate in an ever-changing social environment.
This Article tells the stories of two tenants to illustrate some
of the obstacles and challenges facing tenants and their advocates
today. The stories of Teresa Marshall' and Maria ' were selected to
highlight a persistent problem area: the limitations that a
summary eviction scheme can place on the tenant who attempts to
protect her rights. Though the stories differ in many regards, they
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both illustrate the serious collateral consequences that a tenant
may suffer after the conclusion of the landlord-tenant relationship.
The stories share another important feature: both tell the
stories of female heads of households. As a subset of all renters,
the female head of household faces special challenges in today's
housing market that tenants' advocates cannot ignore. Thus,
before examining the stories of Teresa Marshall and Maria in
more detail in Parts II and III, Part I will provide some of the
context in which their stories occur. Finally, Part IV will identify
some strategies for minimizing the obstacles that tenants continue
to face.
I. THE PRACTICAL AND LEGAL LANDSCAPE
OF THE LANDLORD TENANT RELATIONSHIP
A. The Realities of Women and the Housing Market
By 2000, the number of households headed by women was
nearly triple the size of households headed by men only.3 Though
the last twenty-five years have seen an increase in women's
earning power, the median income for a full-time wage-earning
woman is still just eighty-one percent of a full-time male wage-
earner, or roughly $10,000 less a year.4 The median income of
families with no male present is less than half of the income of
families where males are present.5  The annual incomes of
Hispanic and Black women are even less than the average of all
women, meaning that a higher percentage of their disposable
income must be spent for shelter.
On one end of the economic and residential spectrum, women
have gained power as financial decision-makers, particularly in
connection with the purchase of single-family homes, as the
number of single women buying homes is more than double the
number of single men buying homes.6 However, on the other end
of that same spectrum, households headed by females account for
approximately eighty percent of all federally subsidized
households.7
3. RENE9 E. SPRAGGINS, WE THE PEOPLE: WOMEN AND MEN IN THE
UNITED STATES 8 (2005), available at http'//www.census.gov/prod/
2005pubs/censr-20.pdf.
4. Id. at 12; see also Mickey Meece, What do Women Want? Just Ask, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 29, 2006, § 3, at 1 (restating the female to male wage discrepancy,
but acknowledging the growing power of women as consumers).
5. SPRAGGINS, supra note 3, at 13.
6. Meece, supra note 4.
7. DEPARTMENT OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT, A PICTURE OF
SUBSIDIZED HOUSEHOLDS - 2000, http'//www.huduser.org/picture2000/index
.htm (click on "Click Here to Start a Query," select "U.S. Total," and then
"total for all HUD Programs." Select the variable "pct female-head" and press
"Next Screen." Finally, select "View Data On Screen" and results will appear).
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At the same time, rates for rental housing have risen by
approximately fifty percent since 1970 from approximately $416 to
$608. In 1970, rent accounted for approximately twenty-one
percent of a household's income; today it accounts for
approximately twenty-five percent. Among Blacks and Hispanics,
slightly higher percentages of income are spent on shelter.8 In
some areas of the country, especially those with tight housing
markets, female heads of household may spend upwards of fifty
percent of their income on housing.9
One picture these figures paint is of female renters, scraping
to earn a living, paying a larger portion of their income on rent
each year. In 1992, Professor Barbara Bezdek explored the fate of
such women in Baltimore housing courts." Tenants facing
eviction, she reported, were overwhelmingly female, Black, and
poor. More importantly, she found them facing significant barriers
to the exercise of their rights and powerless to assert their rights
in legal proceedings designed to provide landlords efficient means
to regain possession. Obstacles such as culture, language, and
power stood in the way of presenting valid defenses that in some
cases would have changed the outcome of the eviction process."
Ten years later, in the fall of 2002, similar results were
observed in a study of 763 eviction cases conducted by the
Lawyers' Committee for Better Housing, a Chicago public interest
law firm. 2 Although the study did not comment on the gender or
race of the tenants, the court monitors on the project noted
widespread "lack of respect for the human dignity of tenants." 3
Their observation is hardly surprising given that the average
hearing lasted just one minute and forty-four seconds, rarely
giving tenants the opportunity to present defenses to the
landlords' claims.
4
The statutory bases for the summary procedures observed in
Baltimore and Chicago are not unique. Indeed, they are widely
used in every state in the nation as described more fully below.
8. ROBERT BONNETTE, HOUSING COSTS OF RENTERS: 2000 8 (2003),
available at http'//www.cuensus.gov/prod/2003pubs/c2kbr-21.pdf.
9. CITY OF AUSTIN NEIGHBORHOOD Hous. & CMTY. DEv. DEP'T. (NHCD),
COMMUNITY ACTION NETWORK: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ABOUT
HOUSING 1 (2004), available at http'/www.co.travis.tx.us/healthhuman_
services/research-planning/documents/housing_2004_12.doc.
10. Barbara Bezdek, Silence in the Court: Participation and Subordination
of Poor Tenants' Voices in Legal Process, 20 HOFSTRA L. REV. 533 (1992).
11. See id. at 593-96.
12. LAWYER'S COMMITTEE FOR BETTER HOUSING, NO TIME FOR JUSTICE: A
STUDY OF CHICAGO'S EvICTION COURT (2003), available at http://www.lcbh.
org/ pdf/full report.pdf.
13. Id. at 6.
14. Id.
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B. Limitations of the Summary Proceeding5
Summary eviction procedures exist in every state. 16 Though
details may differ, in general, the summary eviction proceeding is
one that provides an alternative to the landlord's exercise of self-
help by providing the landlord with a fast, effective way to regain
possession of the premises after the tenant has breached a lease.
Procedures may provide that trial must occur in as little as two
days after the defendant is served. 7 Defenses may be limited to
those that would fully defeat the landlord's claim for possession"
and counterclaims, if permitted at all, may be required to be
"based on facts which excuse [the] tenant's breach." 9  The
difficulty of determining which facts might excuse the tenant's
breach often leads to confusion; in some jurisdictions it may lead
to inconsistent application of the law. For example, while Ohio
tenants may assert counterclaims when landlords join a claim for
back rent with the claim for possession, ° it is not clear which
counterclaims a tenant must assert.2' Similarly, Oregon tenants
15. This section is drawn from Mary Spector, Tenants' Rights, Procedural
Wrongs: The Summary Eviction and the Need for Reform, 46 WAYNE L. REV.
135 (2000).
16. See ROBERT S. SCHOSHINSKI, AMERICAN LAW OF LANDLORD AND
TENANT § 6:10 (1980) (discussing the summary eviction processes enacted
throughout the country); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: LANDLORD &
TENANT § 14.1 n. 7 (1977) (listing statutes by state).
17. E.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-1175(c), 12-1177(c) (2003) (service two
days before trial with continuance for 3 days available upon showing of good
cause); CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1167.3 (West 2006) (five days). See generally
SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 16, at § 6:14 (providing a representative sample of
times available under various states' law).
18. See Green v. Superior Court, 517 P.2d 1168, 1179 (Cal. 1974) (holding
that tenant could raise habitability defense in summary eviction); see also
CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1174.2 (West 2006) (codifying the rule in Green).
19. Munden v. Hazelrigg, 711 P.2d 295, 298 (Wash. 1985) (en banc)
(quoting First Union Mgmt. v. Slack, 679 P.2d 936, 939 (Wash. Ct. App.
1984)). In Munden, the court held that although the tenants' claim for
damages to their car on the premises was not based on facts excusing breach,
the tenants' termination of possession prior to trial converted the action to an
ordinary civil proceeding in which damage to the car could be litigated. Id. at
299.
20. Compare Sherman v. Pearson, 673 N.E.2d 643 (Ohio Ct. App. 1996)
(barring tenant's suit against landlord for personal injury on the ground that
claims should have been raised as compulsory counterclaims in prior eviction
proceeding in which landlord joined claim for back rent), with Haney v.
Roberts, 720 N.E.2d 101 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (holding that tenant's claims
against landlord not barred by prior eviction suit where landlord did not join
action for rent). See generally, Kimberly O'Leary, The Inadvisability of
Applying Preclusive Doctrines to Summary Evictions, 30 U. TOL. L. REV. 49
(1998) (critiquing Ohio courts' approach to counterclaims within the summary
eviction).
21. See O'Leary, supra note 20, at 58 (discussing difficulties associated with
applying preclusive doctrines to counterclaims within the summary eviction).
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may assert counterclaims for economic damages arising under the
state's Residential Landlord and Tenant Act, but they may not
assert tort claims for mental distress arising from the same facts."
Despite the problems that restrictions on time and triable
issues may pose for tenants, those restrictions are the basis for the
view that the summary eviction proceeding is a convenient, safe,
and relatively speedy alternative to self-help.2  Indeed, the
Restatement takes the position that unless self-help is expressly
preserved by statute, remedies available through a summary
proceeding are the sole remedies available to a landlord to regain
possession of the premises. 4 Likewise, the Uniform Residential
Landlord Tenant Act provides that a landlord may regain
possession of a dwelling only by court order or when the "tenant
has abandoned or surrendered the premises.""
Some scholars have questioned the underlying fairness of the
proceedings and have suggested alternatives to keep pace with the
changes in the substantive law. 6 But in large measure, there has
22. See Ficker v. Diefenbach, 578 P.2d 467, 470 (Or. Ct. App. 1978); see also
Mead, Samuel & Co. v. Dyar, 622 P.2d 512, 516 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1980)
(counterclaims must arise under rental agreement or under residential tenant
statute). See generally SCHOSHINSKI, supra note 16, § 6:17, at 422 & n.5.
23. See MODEL RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD-TENANT CODE, Art. III, part 2
(Tentative Draft 1969). Some apartment industry representatives would
argue that the process is not efficient enough. See, e.g., CAL. APARTMENT LAW
INFO. FOUND., UNLAWFUL DETAINER STUDY 5 (1991) (expressing landlords'
perception of "increasingly lengthy and complicated eviction process"); see also
Randy Gerchick, Comment, No Easy Way Out: Making the Summary Eviction
Process a Fairer and More Efficient Alternative to Landlord Self-Help, 41
UCLA L. REV. 759, 850-58 (1994) (suggesting reforms needed to protect the
interests of "small landlords").
24. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROP.: 2 LANDLORD & TENANT § 14.2(2)
(1977). While most courts have not gone as far as the Restatement, they have
nevertheless continued to restrict self-help in favor of summary proceedings.
E.g., Helgesen v. City of Fort Atkinson, 291 N.W.2d 660 (1980) (landlord's
actions in sending armed security guard to evict tenant without legal process
were "sufficient to arouse terror or alarm" and although they did not result in
violence they nevertheless constituted forcible, not peaceable, entry). Among
the states abrogating self-help evictions by statute are Alaska, ALASKA STAT.
§ 09.45.060 (2006); Montana, MONT. CODE ANN. § 70-24-428 (2006); New
Mexico, N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-8-36 (Michie 1999); North Carolina, N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 42-25.6 (2005). Numerous courts have interpreted state statutes to be
the sole remedy for landlords as well. E.g., Mendes v. Johnson, 389 A.2d 781
(D.C. 1978) (holding that availability of summary proceeding abrogated
landlord's common law right of self-help); Stanley v. Moore, 454 S.E.2d 225
(N.C. 1995) (holding that statutory summary ejectment proceeding was sole
remedy available to dispossess tenants). But see Day v. Lacchia, 437 N.W.2d
400 (Mich. Ct. App. 1989) (seller of land under land contract may engage in
self-help for peaceable repossession of vacant land).
25. UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT § 3.103(d)(3) (1972).
26. See, e.g., James H. Backman, The Tenant as a Consumer? A
Comparison of Developments in Consumer Law and in Landlord / Tenant Law,
33 OKLA. L. REV. 1, 42 (1980) (suggesting alternative dispute resolution);
2007]
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been little change to the proceeding itself.27 Indeed, in the few
jurisdictions where alternative procedures for resolving landlord-
tenant disputes have been made available, their effectiveness has
been criticized.28  The stories of Teresa Marshall and Maria,
described more fully below, provide evidence that many of the
obstacles to effective exercise of tenants' rights observed in
Baltimore and Chicago housing courts are not confined to those
areas.
II. CHALLENGES FOR TENANTS FACING EVICTION
A. Teresa Marshall's Story
Teresa Marshall received a notice to vacate after a shooting
took place in her federally subsidized apartment. She wasn't the
shooter, nor was she the victim. She was merely a bystander after
a dispute among friends turned ugly.
The trial court awarded possession to the landlord, giving her
fourteen days to move before a writ of possession would issue.
Seven days after the judgment for the landlord, she filed papers
with the court indicating her intent to appeal although she did not
file the $8000 supersedeas bond the trial judge had imposed to
suspend enforcement of the judgment. Then she moved out.
About four months later, while the case was pending on appeal,
her lease expired, resulting in the appellate court's determination
Richard Chused, Contemporary Dilemmas of the Javins Defense: A Note on the
Need for Procedural Reform in Landlord-Tenant Law, 67 GEO. L.J. 1385, 1387
(1979) (suggesting that the 19th-century model for equitable relief might
protect tenants rights during eviction proceedings); Ken Karas, Recognizing a
Right to Counsel for Indigent Tenants in New York, 24 COLUM. J.L. & SOC.
PROBS. 527, 527 (1991) (arguing that tenants facing eviction have a
constitutional right to counsel); O'Leary, supra note 20, at 91 (advocating
changes to preclusive policies in summary evictions); Andrew Scherer,
Gideon's Shelter: The Need to Recognize a Right to Counsel for Indigent
Defendants in Eviction Proceedings, 23 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 557, 557
(1988) (suggesting additional arguments to support the establishment of a
right to counsel). Some of these alternatives will be discussed infra Part IV.
27. See Chused, supra note 26, at 1396 (noting that efforts to reform
procedures in the 19th and 20th centuries did not disturb summary
proceedings for eviction); see also Mary Ann Glendon, The Transformation of
American Landlord-Tenant Law, 23 B.C. L. REV. 503, 536 (1982) (commenting
that "the very basis of traditional summary process law has been
undermined"); Stephen Kirschbaum, Prosecuting and Defending Forcible
Entry and Detainer Actions, J. KAN, B. ASSN, Sept. 1996, at 20 (noting that
substantive law had changed "dramatically" during the previous thirty years
with little change to procedural requirements under stated FED statute).
28. See, e.g., Erica L. Fox, Alone in the Hallway: Challenges to Effective
Self-Representation in Negotiation, 1 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 85, 86 (1996)
(critiquing the mediation model used in Boston Housing Court); see also
Barbara Bezdek, supra note 10, at 540 (analyzing the Baltimore housing
court).
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that her appeal was moot, leaving the trial court judgment in
place.
On appeal to the Texas Supreme Court, Teresa's lawyer
argued that even if the appeal was moot, the court should
nevertheless consider the merits because of the severe, adverse,
collateral consequences that could result from a judgment of
possession for the landlord, not the least of which was the
potential five-year loss of federal housing benefits.29  As a
preliminary matter, the court first decided that Teresa's failure to
post a supersedeas bond in the amount of $8000 did not destroy
her ability to perfect her appeal of the underlying judgment.
However, the court also found that once Teresa's lease expired,
any right she may have had to continuing possession also expired.
And because possession was the sole issue to be decided in the
eviction, the Texas Supreme Court held the appeal was moot.
Although the court was sympathetic to Teresa and her lawyer, and
vacated the underlying judgment, it nevertheless denied her
appeal on the merits. The Texas Supreme Court also rejected the
collateral consequence argument, reasoning that the record -
developed in the summary proceeding in justice court and through
a trial de novo in a county court - did not sufficiently contain
evidence of this possibility.
B. Collateral Consequences of Eviction for
Tenants Receiving Federal Subsidies
The Texas Supreme Court's decision in Teresa's case
demonstrates how both the restrictive time limits and narrow
scope of the proceeding can limit the tenant's exercise of rights
within that process. First, because most residential leases are
short-term - six or twelve months ° - a residential lease will
almost always expire before final exhaustion of appeals in
litigation relating to the lease, foreclosing the tenant from
litigating the underlying issues.
Though Teresa's trial necessarily occurred no more than ten
days from the date she was served with process,3' her appeal
lingered in the appellate courts for nearly four years,32 long after
29. Id. at 785; see also 24 C.F.R. § 982.552(b)(2) (2006) (stating that the
PHA must terminate a family from program assistance after eviction for
"serious violation" of lease); 24 C.F.R. § 982.552(c)(1)(ii) (2006) (providing that
a family may be terminated from program assistance if any family member
has been evicted from federally assisted housing in previous five years).
30. Federal law requires twelve-month leases be used in the case of
subsidized housing. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(1) (2000).
31. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 739.
32. The shooting in Teresa's apartment occurred on July 2, 2002. Brief of
the Petitioner-Appellant at 1, Marshall v. Housing Authority, 198 S.W.3d 782
(Tex. 2006) (No. 04-0147). The trial occurred in 2002 the county court
entering final judgment on November 1, 2002. Petition for Review at Tab 3,
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the expiration of most residential leases.33  Technically, an
unfavorable result in the eviction case does not prevent litigation
of the wrongfulness of the eviction in a separate proceeding.'
However, the practical obstacles, including filing fees and time, to
filing a new lawsuit make the legal right almost illusory.
Second, the scope of the eviction proceeding is limited to
questions related to "actual possession."35 Thus, facts relating to
an alleged breach of lease are the only ones that are relevant 6 and
evidence of the negative consequences the tenant might suffer
after an eviction occurs are irrelevant. By declining to consider
what might happen to Teresa in the event of an eviction for
purposes of determining mootness, the supreme court required
Teresa to come forward with evidence that was outside the scope
of the summary procedure.37
Had such evidence been permitted, it likely would have
shown that because Teresa's lease was federally subsidized, it
contained a lease provision required under federal law mandating
eviction for drug-related criminal activity, or other criminal
activity of the tenant or the tenant's guests "that threatens the
Marshall v. Housing Authority, 198 S.W.3d 782 (2006) (No. 04-0147). More
than a year later, on November 26, 2003, the court of appeals issued its
decision. Petition for Review at Tab 2, supra. The Petition for Review was
filed in the Texas Supreme Court on February 18, 2004, id., and the case was
finally decided nearly two years later on March 3, 2006, Marshall, 198 S.W.3d
782.
33. Leases of longer terms are common in the commercial sector. Indeed,
one commonly used commercial lease form provides for an initial term of five
years with the option to renew for another five-year term. See MARK A. SENN,
COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE LEASES: FORMS § 5.15 (2d ed. 1990) ("Tenant will
have the option to extend the initial five (5) year term of this lease for an
additional period of five (5) years (the "option period") on the same
terms .... "); see also, AllBusiness.com, What's the Ideal Length for a
Commercial Lease?, http'//www.allbusiness.com/business-finance/leasing-
office-leasing/879-1.html (last visited Nov. 19, 2006) (advising that leases for
retail tenants may exceed twenty-five years, while office and warehouse lease
terms average five to ten years).
34. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 24.008 (Vernon 2006) (providing that an
eviction suit is not a bar to a suit for damages); Johnson v. Highland Hills
Drive Apartments, 552 S.W.2d 493, 496 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977) writ refd n.r.e.
568 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1978) (holding tenant's suit for wrongful eviction not
barred by previous judgment of possession for landlord).
35. TEX. R. Civ. P. 746.
36. FED. R. EVID. 401 defines "relevant evidence" as "evidence having any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence."
37. At least one court came to a contrary result. See, e.g., Housing
Authority v. Lamothe, 627 A.2d 367, 371 (Conn. 1993) (reversing judgment of
possession for landlord because of "potentially prejudicial collateral
consequences" and finding negative effect on tenant's eligibility for subsidy in
the future sufficient to overcome landlord's claim of mootness).
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health, safety or right to peaceful enjoyment of the premises by
other tenants."3" Designed to protect tenants in public and
federally subsidized multi-family housing from their neighbors,
the Supreme Court, in HUD v. Rucker,39 upheld the validity of
such clauses and the evictions of four "innocent" California tenants
for unlawful behavior of nonresident relatives or visitors.
Although these clauses have been criticized for their inflexible
application, ° eviction can be just the beginning: once an eviction
under these circumstances occurs, federal law mandates that the
tenant "shall not be eligible for federally assisted housing" for
three to five years after the date of such eviction.41 Because
federal housing subsidies are designed to be assistance of the last
resort, the loss of such benefits can be devastating for families
securing alternative housing.42 Accordingly, full and fair litigation
of the underlying grounds for eviction is essential to the continued
availability of affordable housing.
C. Other Collateral Consequences of Eviction
Suspension of housing benefits and the possibility of
homelessness may be the most severe consequence for a tenant
following an eviction. However, tenants in private housing may
also suffer serious collateral consequences. Among them is the
38. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437(d)(1)(6) (2000) (requiring public housing agencies
to use leases containing provisions prohibiting termination unless "serious
violations," drug use, or other good cause exists, and clauses making certain
criminal activity and illegal drug use grounds for eviction).
39. See Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev. v. Rucker, 535 U.S. 125 (2002)
(holding that public housing authorities had discretion to evict tenants for
criminal activity about which they had no knowledge).
40. See, e.g., Michael A. Cavanagh & M. Jason Williams, Low-Income
Grandparents as the Newest Draftees in the Government's War on Drugs: A
Legal and Rhetorical Analysis of Department of Housing and Urban
Development v. Rucker, 10 GEO. J. ON POVERTY L. & POL'Y 157 (2003); Regina
Austin, "Step on a Crack, Break Your Mother's Back" Poor Moms, Myths of
Authority, and Drug-related Evictions from Public Housing, 14 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISIM 273 (2002); Nelson H. Mock, Punishing the Innocent: No-fault
Eviction of Public Housing Tenants for the Actions of Third Parties, 76 TEX. L.
REV. 1495 (1998); see also NATIONAL HOUSING LAW PROJECT, HUD HOUSING
PROGRAMS: TENANTS' RIGHTS § 2.6.2 (3d ed. 2004) (suggesting strategies for
tenants' advocates seeking to avoid eviction or loss of benefits because of
criminal conduct or drug use); Mary Spector, Crossing the Threshold:
Examining the Abatement of Public Nuisances Within the Home, 31 CONN. L.
REV. 547, 547-48 (1999) (critiquing the effects of nuisance theory on innocent
occupants of residential premises).
41. 42 U.S.C. § 13661(a) (2000); see also 24 C.F.R. § 982.552(b)(2) (2006)
("The PHA must terminate program assistance for a family evited from
housing assisted under the program for serious violation of the lease."); 24
C.F.R. § 982.552(c)(1)(ii) (2006) ("The PHA may at any time deny program
assistance for an applicant... [i]f any member of the family has been evicted
from federally assisted housing in the last five years.").
42. NATIONAL HOUSING LAW PROJECT, supra note 40, at 1/13.
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reporting of information relating to eviction proceedings in the
context of a consumer report.' A report containing negative
information not only can make securing replacement housing
difficult, but also can adversely affect the tenant's ability to secure
employment, insurance, or other business opportunities."
Consumer reports used for the purpose of determining eligibility
for rental housing are widely used by landlords in connection with
the selection of tenants' and may contain information relating to
the timeliness of the tenant's rental history as well as the tenant's
prior involvement in eviction proceedings. '  For example, a
consumer reporting agency' may routinely report that tenants are
"not adjudicated as the prevailing party" unless they obtain a
summary judgment in their favor or a judgment after trial.' Or,
the agency may fail to report the outcome of the actions, even in
cases that were voluntarily dismissed by the landlords." Because
landlords generally are free to use reports of a prior eviction to
avoid selection of tenants with poor rental histories or costs
43. See 15 U.S.C. 1681a(d)(1) (2000). "Consumer report" is defined as:
[Any written, oral, or other communication of any information by a
consumer reporting agency bearing on a consumer's credit worthiness,
credit standing, credit capacity, character, general reputation, personal
characteristics, or mode of living which is used or expected to be
used... as a factor in establishing ... eligibility for credit or
insurance... [or] employment purposes.
Id.
44. See, e.g., Feldman v. Comprehensive Info. Servs., Inc., No.
X01CV010170630S, 2003 WL 22413484, at *6 (Conn. Super. Ct., Oct. 6, 2003)
(denying summary judgment for defendant on plaintiffs claims that
misleading reports of criminal background led to loss of employment);
Reynolds v. Hartford Fin. Servs. Group, Inc., 435 F.3d 1081, 1100-01 (9th Cir.
2006), cert. granted, GEICO Gen. Ins. Co. v. Edo, 127 S. Ct. 36 (2006) (holding
that consumers were entitled to notice of adverse action by insurers on basis of
consumer reports at time of initial placement of insurance).
45. See Wilson v. Rental Research Serv., Inc., 165 F.3d 642, 643 (8th Cir.
1999), vacated and reh'g en banc granted, 191 F.3d 911 (8th Cir. 1999), affd en
banc, 206 F.3d 810 (8th Cir. 2000) (noting that in Minnesota alone, one such
service has subscribers owning more than 200,000 rental units); Conley v.
TRW Credit Data, 381 F.Supp. 473, 474 (N.D. Ill. 1974) (holding wife entitled
to cause of action against agency for erroneous report of husband's rental
history in connection with leasing of apartment).
46. See Wilson, 165 F.3d at 643;.see also Cotto v. Jenney, 721 F.Supp. 5, 6
(D. Mass. 1989) (explaining that landlords use these agencies to evaluate
prospective tenants).
47. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1681(a)(f) (2000) (defining "consumer reporting
agency" as "any person which... regularly engages in whole or in part in the
practice of assembling or obtaining consumer credit information or other
information on consumers for the purpose of furnishing consumer reports to
third parties.").
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associated with evictions," the integrity of the summary eviction
proceeding is essential.
As Teresa's story illustrates some of the challenges to tenants
facing eviction in summary proceedings, Maria's story highlights
challenges arising from another feature of the summary eviction
proceeding: its exception.
III. CHALLENGES FACING TENANTS OUTSIDE
OF THE EVICTION PROCESS
A. Maria's Story
Maria's form lease - six legal-sized pages front and back -
required her to give thirty days written notice to the landlord if
she planned to move out at the end of the term. Otherwise, the
terms of the lease would remain in force on a month to month
basis.
In early May, prior to the expiration of Maria's lease, she
went into the manager's office to obtain a "move-out" form the
management provided. She signed and dated the form, indicating
her intent to move out when her lease term expired - May 31. On
May 17, the manager informed Maria that her check for the May
rent had been returned for insufficient funds and they agreed that
the May rent could be paid upon move-out.
Over the Memorial Day weekend, Maria and her three
children began to move their belongings to their new home in a
nearby suburb. Leaving the big pieces for last, Maria hired a
moving company to remove them on May 27, four days before the
expiration of the lease, leaving her plenty of time to clean the
apartment before returning the key. However, when she went
back to the apartment on May 27 to meet the movers, her key
didn't work. When she confronted one of the managers, she was
told that because the last month's rent was unpaid, the landlord
believed she had abandoned the premises and disposed of the
furniture and other items remaining in the apartment. When
50. One screening agency reports that a landlord's costs associated with an
eviction can amount to $1500 per eviction. Such costs may also include lost
rental income suffered during the time that may elapse between filing a
complaint and the execution of the judgment. For example, during 1990, in
the District of Columbia, the average time between filing the complaint and
executing the eviction was approximately four months. See UNITED STATES
GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE VICE-CHAIRMAN, COMMITTEE
ON THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, INFORMATION
ON COURT-ORDERED TENANT EVICTIONS 4 (1990).
A 1991 study conducted by the California Apartment Law Information
Foundation estimated "conservatively" that California landlords lost nearly
$4.5 million each day that elapsed between the date of filing suit and final
judicial disposition of unlawful detainer suits. CAL. APARTMENT LAw INFO.
FOUND., supra note 23, at 20.
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Maria reminded the manager of her intended move-out date and
the agreement she had reached with the assistant manager, a
second agreement was reached: they would call it even by using
Maria's security deposit to cover the last month's rent in exchange
for Maria waiving her right to seek remedies for the unlawful
lockout. Neither this agreement, nor Maria's original agreement
with the assistant manager, was reduced to writing.
All seemed to be fine, until a couple of months later, when
Maria started receiving written notices that she owed the landlord
more than $2000. Knowing that she had come to an agreement
with the manager, she ignored the notices. Then a debt collection
firm started harassing her. Maria eventually learned that the
"debt" attempting to be collected arose from the apartment
complex's charge of an "early termination fee" that the lease
identified as liquidated damages owed upon breach of the lease,
moving charges attributed to the moving of Maria's furniture out
of the apartment, and cleaning and re-letting fees. Maria disputed
the debt and requested the debt collection firm cease all contact
with her, but the firm ignored her request.
Eventually, Maria filed suit against the apartment complex
and its manager for the unlawful lockout, breach of contract, and
fraud, and against the collection agency for violations of state and
federal debt collection laws as well as deceptive trade practices.
Two and a half years later, all claims were resolved.
B. The Exception Swallows the Rule
In many states, "abandonment" of the premises permits a
landlord to obtain possession of a unit without court process. 5'
Some states provide a statutory definition of the term, such as
"[t] otal absence from the premises without notice to landlord for
one full rental period or thirty days, whichever is less";2 others,
51. See, e.g., UNIF. RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ACT §§ 4.203(c),
4.207 (1972); accord ALASKA STAT. §§ 34.03.230(b), 34.03.280 (2006); ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1370 (2000); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47a-llb(b)-(c) (2006);
FLA. STAT. § 83.59(3)(c) (2004); IOWA CODE §§ 562A.29(3), 562A.33 (2005);
KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 58-2565(b)-(c), -2569 (2005); KY. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 383.690 (West 2005); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.2918(3)(c) (2000); MONT.
CODE ANN. §§ 70-24-426, -428 (2005); NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1432 (2004); N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 47-8-34(c), 47-8-36(A) (2001); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 90.410(c),
90.435 (2003); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 34-18-40, 34-18-44 (1995); S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 27-40-730(a)-(c), 27-40-760 (2005); TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-28-405 (2004);
VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.33 (2003).
While the Texas statute does not explicitly provide for repossession
upon abandonment without court process, it does allow a landlord to
"intentionally prevent a tenant from entering the leased premises [where] the
exclusion results from... removing the contents or premises abandoned by a
tenant." TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.0081(b)(2) (Vernon 2006).
52. NEB. REV. STAT. § 76-1432(3) (2004); accord ALASKA STAT.
§§ 34.03.360(1), 34.03.280 (2006); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33-1370(H) (2001);
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such as Texas, do not. 3
But even in those states that have a broad - and more
subjective - statutory definition of "abandonment," common-law
definitions may still apply, as in, for example, Connecticut,
Kansas, and Nebraska. '  An unreported Connecticut case
indicated that the statutory element of a tenant's intent not to
return "may be proven either under the broader common law
standards or by resort to the indicia specified in the statute.""
Therefore, a landlord may be able to infer that the tenant has
abandoned by circumstances not found in the statute.' Likewise,
while the Nebraska statute states that "total absence from the
premises without notice to landlord for one full rental period or
thirty days, whichever is less, shall constitute abandonment," 7 the
Nebraska Supreme Court held that abandonment may also be
"circumstantially evidenced by conduct inconsistent with
continued control over the leased premises."58 The Kansas statute
assumes abandonment has occurred where "the tenant is 10 days
in default for nonpayment of rent and has removed a substantial
portion of such tenant's belongings from the dwelling unit."5 9 But
the state supreme court stated that this merely "provides some
insight" into what constitutes abandonment, and that the well-
CONN. GEN. STAT. § 47a-lib(a) (2006); FLA. STAT. § 83.59(3)(c) (2004); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 58-2565(b) (2005); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 47-8-36(A) (2001); R.I. GEN.
LAWS § 34-18-11(1) (2005); TENN. CODE ANN. § 66-28-405(a)-(b)(1) (2004);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-36-12.3(3) (2003). Cf. MICH. COMP. LAWS
§ 600.2918(3)(c) (2000) (treating a good faith belief the tenant had abandoned
as one of three elements, along with reason to believe tenant intends to not
return and current rent is not paid, as a defense to liability for interfering
with a tenant's possession of premises); S.C. CODE ANN. § 27-40-730(a) ("The
unexplained absence of a tenant from a dwelling unit for a period of fifteen
days after default in the payment of rent must be construed as abandonment
of the dwelling unit."); VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.33 (2003) (providing a
rebuttable presumption of abandonment after seven days of notice by landlord
requiring tenant to give notice of intent to remain in occupancy).
53. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.0081(b)(2) (Vernon 2006); accord UNIF.
RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD AND TENANT ACT §§ 4.203(c), 4.207 (1972); IOWA
CODE §§ 562A.29(3), 562A.33; Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 383.690; MICH. COMP.
LAWS § 600.2918(3)(c); MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 70-24-426, -428; S.C. CODE ANN.
§§ 27-40-730(a)-(c), -760; VA. CODE ANN. § 55-248.33.
54. See Forbotnik v. Kalinowski, CVH 5967, H-1186, 2000 Conn. Super.
LEXIS 363, at *19 (Conn. Super. Ct., Jan. 11, 2000); Gnandt v. DaCruz, NO.
CVBR-9403-02236, 1994 WL 197699, at *2 (Conn. Super. Ct., April 27, 1994);
Mason v. Schumacher, 439 N.W.2d 61, 67-69 (Neb. 1989); Davis v. Odell, 729
P.2d 1117, 1123-25 (Kan. 1986).
55. Gnandt, 1994 WL 197699 at *2; see also Forbotnik, 2000 Conn. Super.
LEXIS 363 at *19.
56. See Gnandt, 1994 WL 197699 at *2.
57. NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 76-1432(3).
58. Mason, 439 N.W.2d at 68-69.
59. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 58-2565(b).
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established common-law definition of abandonment "logically
should be applied.' °
"Abandonment" was, however, defined in Maria's six-page
lease as occurring when: (1) everybody appears to have moved out
in our reasonable judgment; (2) clothes, furniture and personal
belongings are substantially removed from the apartment; and (3)
no one has been in the apartment for 5 consecutive days while the
rent is due and unpaid.
By leaving the definition as a matter of contract, statutes
effectively offer an end-run around the summary eviction
proceeding by permitting the landlord to obtain possession without
resort to legal process by claiming that a tenant has abandoned
the premises. Although Maria had reached not one, but two
agreements with management regarding the termination of her
tenancy, neither agreement was in writing, a requirement for an
enforceable modification of the lease terms. Accordingly, the
terms of the written lease supplied by the landlord controlled,
enabling the landlord to determine, unilaterally, that Maria
abandoned the premises and to regain possession without resort to
court process.
C. Post-tenancy Effects of Abandonment
Once the landlord determined that Maria had breached the
lease by abandonment, the landlord could, in addition to regaining
possession, seek other contractual remedies for breach. Such
remedies included a termination fee amounting to approximately
seventy-five percent of the rental amount, retention of the security
deposit, damages for removal of property, and the costs of
cleaning.
When the landlord placed a dollar amount on the remedies he
maintained he was entitled to receive, reducing his remedies to an
alleged "debt," and furnished it to a consumer reporting agency, he
unleashed a ripple effect with a devastating potential to adversely
affect Maria's ability to seek replacement housing. Morever, while
federal law requires most financial institutions to notify
consumers when it furnishes such information to a consumer
reporting agency," no such requirement exists for other creditors,
including landlords. Thus, for many tenants, it may be many
months before they become aware that their credit reports contain
adverse information.
60. Davis, 729 P.2d at 1123.
61. See 15 U.S.C. § 1681s-2(a)(7)(A)(I) (2000) (requiring financial
institutions that extend credit and regularly furnish information to consumer
reporting agencies to provide notice, in writing, to the consumer of furnishing
negative information).
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As if the adverse effects resulting from the reporting of
negative information were not enough,62 the landlord also referred
the alleged debt resulting from Maria's so-called abandonment for
collection. For Maria, that meant repeated and harassing phone
calls, precisely the kinds of abusive practices Congress intended to
eliminate with the Federal Debt Collection Practices Act.6
Maria, unlike Teresa, eventually resolved the claims arising
from her failed landlord-tenant relationship. Yet, doing so
required legal counsel and the commencement of litigation against
her former landlord as well as the debt collection agency. It also
required time: final resolution did not come until two and a half
years after the expiration of her lease. During that period, Maria
lived with the stress and uncertainty that accompanies pending
litigation, as well as the stigma of an adverse credit report and the
indignity associated with the harassing conduct of debt collection
activities.
IV. CONCLUDING THOUGHTS
The stories of Teresa and Maria illustrate some of the
obstacles facing tenants long after the promulgation of
comprehensive codes designed to protect their rights. Indeed,
some of the obstacles arise from the complex nature of statutes
that embody those rights and the procedures that exist for
asserting them.
What is the tenant or advocate to do? Experts have suggested
a variety of tools and options to support tenants. They include a
right to legal counsel in such cases, sometimes called "housing
Gideon,"' effective tenant and judicial education, as well as
legislation and advocacy to account for the diversity of the tenant
population.
Housing Gideon: In August 2006, the American Bar
Association joined tenants' and civil rights advocates to urge
federal, state and territorial authorities to provide legal counsel as
"a matter of right at public expense" in cases involving "shelter,
sustenance, safety, health or child custody." 5 By doing so, the
ABA put its weight behind what tenants' advocates have argued
for years: access to justice can only become a reality with effective
legal representation.
62. See supra Part II.C.
63. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692(e) (2000) (stating the purpose of the Act is "to
eliminate abusive debt collection practices by debt collectors").
64. See Rachel Kleinman, Comment, Housing Gideon: the Right to Counsel
in Eviction Cases, 31 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1507 (2004); Karas, supra note 26;
Sherer, supra note 26.
65. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, TASK FORCE ON ACCESS TO CIVIL
JUSTICE, REPORT TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 1 (2006), available at
httpJ/www.abanet.org/legalservices/sclaid/downloads/06A112A.pdf.
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Tenant education: In many communities around the country,
tenants' unions or other forms of tenants' advocacy groups provide
regular, free advice to tenants in need.' Yet, there are many more
tenants than there are advocates and effective education is time-
consuming, expensive, and logistically difficult. Indeed, in some,
mostly urban areas, such groups have been effective in securing
more substantial rights for tenants than may be otherwise
available to tenants in other parts of the state. 7 In Chicago, for
example, landlords must provide new and renewing tenants with a
written summary of their rights, and failure to do so is grounds for
termination of the lease.'
Judicial education: In the predatory lending context, law
school legal clinics have been effective in working with local bar
associations to educate judges about predatory lending and the
fact that defenses other than payment may exist in a judicial
foreclosure action.69 Some of their strategies can translate well
into the landlord-tenant area as tenants' advocates work with local
bar associations and the courts to educate housing court judges
about important realities facing tenants in their courts."0
Accounting for diversity of tenant population: Another
important challenge for tenants and their advocates is accounting
for the diversity of tenant population (e.g., language, culture,
66. The Illinois Tenants Union is one such organization. First organized in
1976, it serves approximately 8000 tenants in the metropolitan Chicago area.
See Illinois Tenants Union, About Us, http://www.tenant.org/about.htm (last
visited Apr. 8, 2007) (noting the number of service calls received each year).
In Dallas, the Housing Crisis Center, founded in 1978 as the Dallas Tenants
Union, provides a range of services to tenants and their families. With a staff
of twenty and more than 250 volunteers, it is contacted by more than 20,000
people a year. See Housing Crisis Center: Making our Community a Better
Home for Everyone, http://www.hccdallas.org/indexl.html (last visited Apr. 8,
2007).
67. See Illinois Tenants Union, supra note 66. Compare CHICAGO, ILL.,
RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ORDINANCE §§ 5-12-010 to -200 (1986)
(specifying detailed regulations for certain residential dwelling units
regarding landlord and tenant responsibilities and remedies), with 735 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/9-101 to -218 (2004) (providing some, but far fewer, regulations
regarding the landlord-tenant relationship) and 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. 705/0.01
to /5, 710/0.01 to /2, 715/0.01 to /3 (2004) (providing additional regulations
regarding the landlord-tenant relationship concerning eviction, security
deposits, and liability exemptions).
68. CHICAGO, ILL., RESIDENTIAL LANDLORD & TENANT ORDINANCE § 5-12-
170.
69. See Allyn M. O'Connor, Business Law Pro Bono: Surveying the
Opportunities to Volunteer, 10 DIALOGUE 21 (Summer 2006), available at
http://www.abanet.org/legalservices/dialogue/downloads/dialogue2006sum.pdf
(last visited Apr. 8, 2007).
70. A simple recommendation made by The Lawyers' Committee for Better
Housing suggests and urges housing court judges to take time to explain the
process to tenants and "rigorously" adhere to procedural requirements. See
LAWYERS' COMMITTEE FOR BETTER HOUSING, supra note 12, at 5.
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gender, etc.). Calls for simplicity of court and contract forms in
plain English, plain Spanish or other languages commonly used in
the jurisdiction are not new. 1 Although there is much resistance
in the current political climate,2 some small strides are being
made as legislatures begin to recognize that not all tenants are
alike. For example, a recent amendment in Texas permits victims
of domestic violence to be released from the obligations of a lease
prior to the lease term upon the production of a temporary
injunction or valid protective order. 3 Similarly, federal housing
law protects victims of domestic violence from eviction when
members of their households engage in unlawful conduct. 74
These are just a few of the approaches that tenants and their
advocates have taken. They can be complex, requiring careful
attention to court rules, statutes, and regulations and there are
not enough lawyers to meet demand. The procedures can be time-
consuming, and tenants want immediate relief; they want to go on
with their lives, to rent another apartment, stop the debt
collectors, and receive uninterrupted benefits. Advocates for
tenants fortunate enough to have representation must be mindful
not only of the terms of the landlord-tenant relationship, but also
of the procedures for deciding its continuity and the collateral
consequences that may linger long after the relationship is over.
71. Outside the landlord-tenant context, it is argued that plain language
court forms may be a matter of due process. Todd b. Hilsee et al., Do You
Really Want Me To Know My Rights? The Ethics Behind Due Process in Class
Action Notice Is More Than Just Plain Language: A Desire to Actually Inform,
18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHiCS 1359, 1360 (2005) (discussing "the communications
underpinnings of due process in class action notice").
72. See Stephanie Sandoval, Groups Decry FB Law. Apartment Association,
Others Weigh Action; Some Migrants Fearful, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Nov.
15, 2006, at 1A (reporting that suburban Dallas community passed two
ordinances, one English-only, the other requiring landlords of multi-family
housing to require prospective tenants to provide proof of citizenship or legal
residency before leasing an apartment).
73. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 92.016(b)-(g) (Vernon 2006); see also 42
U.S.C. 1437d(l)(5) (protecting victims of domestic violence against eviction on
grounds of serious criminal activity in the household).
74. See 42 U.S.C. § 1437d(l)(6)(A) (providing exception to mandatory
eviction where tenant is victim of domestic violence).
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